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i Abstract 
Water quality in Lake Rotorua has been declining for at least the last 30 years as 
increased levels of nutrients have entered the lake. Despite significant effort and 
expenditure, the level of nutrients entering the lake still exceeds sustainable levels. 
A nutrient trading system would help the catchment achieve this goal at least cost. 
Nutrient sources would bear the cost of their impact on water quality and hence 
take these costs into account in their decision-making. This paper presents a 
prototype nutrient trading system for achieving cost effective nutrient loss 
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1 This paper draws together preliminary conclusions from a series of papers on various aspects of 
design of a nutrient trading system for Lake Rotorua. It does not provide detailed justification for 
these conclusions. These arguments are provided in the underlying papers listed at the end which 
can be found at www.motu.org.nz/nutrient_trading. 
ii 1 Introduction 
A nutrient trading system controls nutrient loss by setting the total 
amount of allowances equal to the environmental goal. All nutrient sources 
included in the system monitor their nutrient loss and must surrender sufficient 
allowances to cover their nutrient loss at the end of each trading year. Any source 
of nutrients can be included in the system, including landowners and sewerage 
plants.  
The exact level of nutrient loss cannot be measured directly from most 
nutrient sources in the Lake Rotorua catchment. When the nutrient loss comes 
from diffuse sources (such as leaching through soil into the groundwater), models 
are required to estimate the nutrient loss off a particular property. Models for 
properties in the Lake Rotorua catchment have been developed by AgResearch, 
NIWA and GNS in conjunction with Environment Bay of Plenty. Within the 
nutrient trading system, one model, almost certainly incorporating a version of 
OVERSEER, will be used to calculate the nutrient loss for all properties in the 
system.
2   
If a source has insufficient allowances to cover their nutrient loss, they 
must purchase additional allowances from the market. If a source has surplus 
allowances, they can sell the extra allowances. Thus sources can receive direct 
financial benefits for reducing their nutrient loss. Nutrient sources that previously 
had sufficient allowances can sell their excess, and those that had insufficient 
allowances now need to purchase less to cover their nutrient loss. Trading allows 
sources with high costs of achieving nutrient loss reduction to pay the sources 
with a low cost of achieving nutrient loss reductions to undertake the necessary 
reductions, ensuring that nutrient reductions take place in the most cost effective 
locations.  
                                                           
2 OVERSEER is a nutrient budgeting model that was developed by AgResearch.  It estimates the 
nutrient loss of different types of properties based on geophysical properties such as soil type and 
rainfall, land use and farm management practices. Ideally, the same model will be used to model 
greenhouse gases in the New Zealand Emissions Trading System. 
1 We envisage that this system would cover both nitrogen and 
phosphorus as both are important for long-term lake quality, and landowners need 
to collect the same information to calculate nitrogen and phosphorus loss. Thus 
the cost of including phosphorus in the system is low; however, the system 
administrator would need to maintain a registry for two types of allowances, and 
sources would have to balance two different nutrients against allowance holdings. 
These costs are low compared with the benefits of including phosphorus in the 
system.  
2  Setting a cap and defining allowances 
2.1  Setting a cap 
Before a nutrient trading system can be implemented, the acceptable 
level (or goal level) of nutrient loss into the lake each year needs to be 
determined. The exact path to these goals should be chosen through a well-
informed political process that trades off both environmental and economic 
outcomes. Setting this path is beyond the scope of this project.
3 For the remainder 
of this paper we will assume that the path of these goals has already been 
determined.  
For a nutrient trading system it is not the total amount of nutrients that 
reach the lake that is important, but the amount that is able to come from the 
sources within the system, or the ‘trading cap’ (Figure 1). A significant level of 
nutrients enter the lake from ‘unmanageable sources’ and in particular the 
nutrients already in the groundwater system in the Lake Rotorua catchment, which 
will enter the lake regardless of actions taken today. Other unmanageable flows 
include nutrient loss from rainwater, waterfowl and the baseline nutrient loss of 3 
kg/ha/yr of nitrogen and 0.1 kg/ha/yr of phosphorus. In the nutrient trading system 
landowners will not be made responsible for the first 3 kg/ha/yr of nitrogen loss 
and 0.1 kg/ha/yr of phosphorus loss from their property as they cannot change 
land use to reduce below this level. To achieve the desired environmental 
outcome, the total level of nutrients able to enter the lake from sources within the 
                                                           
3 We also do not consider action to divert nutrient flows or stabilise lake sediments.  
2 nutrient trading system must be the goal level minus the amount of nutrients that 
will enter the lake from ‘unmanageable sources’.
4 This will ensure that the 
environmental target is achieved, as the nutrient trading system will not exceed its 
cap. The trading cap determines the number of allowances created for each year.  
Figure 1 The relationship between exports, inputs and unmanageable 
inputs in determining the trading cap 
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2.2 Vintage  allowances 
The position of each source in the Lake Rotorua catchment has 
significant implications for its contribution to the lake's water quality. While 
nutrients are uniformly distributed once they reach the lake, the location of a 
property determines how long they take to get there. Nutrient loss from properties 
in the catchment can take from 0 to 200 years to reach the lake because of 
groundwater lags. To account for this variability, we propose that a series of 
‘vintage’ markets are used. Each market would cover the nutrients entering the 
lake in a given year and will have its own trading cap and allowances (Figure 1). 
In its simplest form, each allowance has a vintage associated with it and can only 
be used to cover nutrient loss that will reach the lake in that year. Thus the 
                                                           
4 In this prototype system, all manageable nutrient sources are included in the system. If some 
nutrient sources were excluded from the system, then the trading cap would be even lower to take 
account of the nutrient loss from sources outside of the trading system.  
3 nutrient trading system requires nutrient sources to be responsible for their input 
levels into the lake rather than the export levels off their property. As off-site 
attenuation does not play a major role in this catchment, the inputs and exports 
from a particular property can be considered equal, but these can happen in 
different time periods due to the groundwater lags. Each nutrient source in the 
catchment will be assigned to a single groundwater lag zone depending on how 
long their nutrient loss takes to reach the lake.  
Vintage allowances will not make operating in the system more 
complicated for the nutrient sources as each will know what groundwater lag they 
have and therefore which vintage allowances need to be surrendered each year. 
For example, a property that has a one-year lag between the nutrients leaving the 
land and entering the lake will be in a one-year groundwater lag zone. The 
nutrient loss from the property will always need to be covered by allowances with 
a vintage one year from the current period. Thus in 2009 they need to surrender 
2010 vintage allowances to cover their nutrient loss and in 2058 they need to 
surrender 2059 vintage allowances. A property with a 50-year groundwater lag 
will be in the 50-year lag zone and will always use allowances with a vintage 50 
years from the present year: in 2009 they need to surrender 2059 vintage 
allowances and in 2058 they need to surrender 2108 vintage allowances. All 
nutrient sources in the catchment will surrender allowances each year to cover 
their nutrient loss but the allowance vintage used will differ across the 
groundwater zones.  
Individual nutrient sources can trade with others in their groundwater 
lag zone, as well as with sources with different groundwater lag zones. Trading 
between different groundwater lag zones will impact upon the timing of exports 
from properties but not the timing of inputs to the lake. For example, using the 
properties described above, the 1-year groundwater lag property could buy 2059 
vintage allowances off the 50-year lag property, shifting the exports from  2009 to 
2058 but the same amount of nutrients will reach the lake in 2059.  
If every nutrient source in the catchment were assigned an exact 
groundwater lag time, there would be up to 200 different groundwater zones since 
nutrients can take between 0 and 200 years to reach the lake. Thus in a given year, 
4 allowances of up to 200 different vintages would be surrendered. This is not ideal 
as the market for each allowance vintage will probably be too thin at any point in 
time, and in any case current groundwater modelling is not able to be this exact. 
Thus we suggest that groundwater zones are created where nutrient sources can 
use any allowance within their zone. For example, if there was a one to three year 
groundwater lag zone, a nutrient source in this zone could use any allowances 
with a vintage of 2010, 2011 or 2012 to cover their nutrient loss in 2009. More 
analysis is needed to determine the appropriate number and range of zones  in a 
vintage allowance system for Lake Rotorua.  
3  Who is included in the system? 
We propose to include all nutrient loss sources in the system as this 
provides the most nutrient reduction options and is therefore the most cost 
effective. To avoid high compliance costs for smaller nutrient loss sources, we 
propose three different forms of participation (Figure 2).
5 Nutrient sources will be 
direct participants in the system if the land use cover on their parcel exceeds  at 
least 10 ha of combined dairy, horticulture and cropping land; or at least 25 ha of 
combined pastoral, horticultural and cropping; or they are point source 
dischargers. These participants are required to report detailed monitoring data to 
enable the nutrient loss model to be estimated. Nutrient sources that have parcels 
of at least 10 ha but which do not meet the above thresholds are included in the 
system but are only required to report the area of each land use. Their nutrient loss 
from pastoral farming can be calculated using default values provided by 
Environment Bay of Plenty (EBOP).
6 These landowners will have the option of 
reporting more detailed data. All parcels less than 10 ha are the responsibility of 
the Rotorua District Council (RDC) (if they are defined as urban under local 
regulations) or EBOP (if defined as non-urban).
7 The Department of Conservation 
is also responsible for nutrient loss off their land.  
                                                           
5 These different forms of participation may need to be aligned with the emissions trading system 
if that system is introduced at a farm scale.  
6 The nutrient loss from exotic and plantation forestry is currently only a function of land use area. 
Therefore there is no need for default values for these land uses.  
7 Urban land is defined in EBOP’s Regional Water and Land Plan as “an area which contains an 
aggregation of more than 50 lots or sites of an average size of no more than 1000m
2”. The same 
definition should be used here to define urban and non-urban areas. 
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Individual properties can be made up of multiple parcels, yet we 
propose that parcels rather than properties are used to determine whether land is 
included in the system. This is because parcels are less likely to change over time. 
Farmers often manage their parcels simultaneously, and the system would allow a 
landowner to submit a joint report. Since some of the parcels in a property may be 
less than 10 ha, the landowner can choose to include these parcels in the system. 
6 However, to prevent parcels entering and exiting the system each year, we 
propose that once parcels are included they must stay in the system until the 
parcel is sold.  
By including all nutrient sources in the system, we can ensure that the 
most cost effective nutrient reductions can be achieved while reducing compliance 
costs for small sources.  
4  Who receives allowances? 
Allocation of allowances is always one of the most contentious issues in any 
trading system because of the high value of the allowances and the considerable 
costs that regulation can impose. Therefore it is vital that the allocation rules are 
based on sound principles, are simple, and are based on readily available data that 
cannot be challenged.  
We propose that the system initially allocates allowances to nutrient 
sources in proportion to their current nutrient loss to ease the initial economic 
impact. This does not ensure that nutrient loss sources receive sufficient 
allowances to cover their current nutrient loss, especially if the trading cap is 
lower than current nutrient loss levels. Also not all nutrient sources will receive 
the same vintage allowances. The vintage allowances received by the nutrient 
source will depend on their vintage zone. For example, a property with a 50-year 
groundwater lag will not receive any allowances from the first 50 vintages as the 
property will never be required to cover nutrient inputs for these years.  
Allowing nutrient sources to maintain their current nutrient loss will not 
achieve water quality goals and therefore it needs to be decided who will pay for 
the required nutrient loss reductions. If only the number of allowances equal to the 
goal were allocated, the environmental target would be achieved but most of the 
cost of nutrient reductions would be borne by the nutrient sources. In contrast, if 
sufficient allowances were allocated to cover current nutrient loss, and the 
government bought back and retired sufficient allowances to meet the goal, then 
tax or rate payers would bear all of the cost and nutrient sources would actually 
7 profit from the system.
8 A point between these two extremes is likely to be ideal, 
with nutrient sources and central and local government each bearing some of the 
cost of achieving the reductions (Figure 3). In such a case, nutrient sources will be 
allocated fewer allowances than they need to cover current nutrient loss and 
central and local government will buy some allowances from the market to 
achieve the remainder of the reduction required to achieve the goal level of inputs.  
Figure 3: Sharing the costs of reducing nutrient loss 
  Current nutrient exports 
Trading cap 
Buy back 
Reduction at landowner expense 
Free 
allocation 
Inputs ‘Rule 11’ 
Inputs ‘goal’ 
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The share of the reduction paid by each of the parties should be 
consistent across vintages and explicitly defined. For instance, it may look like the 
following: 
•  X% is through District Council buy-back 
•  Y% is through Regional Council buy-back 
•  Z% is through Central Government buy-back 
•  The remainder of the reduction is a proportional cut in unused 
allowance holdings of the appropriate vintage.  
                                                           
8 The reductions that are funded by central or local government should be used to purchase 
allowances directly off allowance holders via a tender process where allowance holders submit 
tenders stating how many allowances of each vintage they are willing to sell and for what price. 
Allowances are purchased from the lowest price bids until the required allowances have all been 
purchased. A single buy back process could be used and the funding of the allowances split 
between the three funders.  
8 This ensures that all parties bear some of the cost but that the reductions are not 
too great a burden on any party.  
For allowances beyond the vintages that each landowner needs in the 
first few years of the system, the allocation mechanism will transition to one 
based on potential nutrient loss providing a more equitable system. This prevents 
landowners becoming trapped in their current land use if they do not have 
sufficient capital to purchase allowances and avoids rewarding high nutrient loss 
properties indefinitely. To enable this to happen, a measure of potential nutrient 
loss needs to be determined. Some potential options are land use capability (based 
on slope, soil type, etc.) and potential stocking rates applied through the 
OVERSEER model with ‘standard’ management practices.  
The same calibration of OVERSEER (with add-ons) that is used to 
monitor the system should be used for allocation initially, to align allocation and 
obligations to surrender, and to reduce risk to participants. This limits the 
incentives for participants to bias model calibration. A landowner who increases 
nutrient loss to gain more allowances in the allocation process will be required to 
surrender more allowances each year.  
The allocation of allowances should be carried out in stages, rather than 
individuals receiving all future allowances at once. For example, individuals could 
receive vintage allowances relevant to their first five years in the system. This 
would protect those allowance holders who do not yet fully understand the system 
from selling allowances prematurely or at a low price. Initially only allocating five 
years of allowances also protects the system’s credibility as it prevents the 
majority of allowances being used in the first few years. Using the majority of 
allowances early on would severely restrict future nutrient loss in zones with short 
groundwater lags. This would lead to increased pressure to increase the trading 
caps and/or abandon the system. Regular injections of allowances could also lead 
to periods of increased trading as individuals adjust their allowance holdings 
providing regular price signals for the market. 
We propose that allowances are initially allocated as a proportion of 
current nutrient loss to ease the economic transition. After a few years this should 
9 transition to an allocation mechanism based on potential nutrient loss to prevent 
rewarding high nutrient loss sources and to prevent landowners feeling trapped in 
their current land use. 
5  Reporting and compliance 
The model used to monitor nutrient loss will be fixed before each 
compliance year so that participants can use it throughout the year when making 
management, compliance and trading decisions. To comply with the nutrient 
trading system, at the end of each compliance year sources must report data and 
run the model to calculate the nutrient loss off their property.
9 The landowner 
must have enough allowances in their registry account to cover all nutrient loss 
above the minimum 3kg/ha/yr baseline that plantation forestry achieves.  
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The administering agency checks the returns and, if satisfied, passes 
information on the number of allowances of each vintage to be surrendered to the 
registry. They also identify properties to be audited. Properties can be audited for 
two different reasons: as a spot check or due to suspicious returns. An auditing 
agency undertakes these audits. Once the returns from a property are accepted, the 
                                                           
9 July – June years are probably the most suitable cycle for reporting nutrient loss and surrendering 
allowances. The timing of the trading year may, however, require further thought.  
10 registry removes the surrendered allowances from the property’s allowance 
holdings. Nutrient sources that have insufficient allowances to cover their nutrient 
loss will face a fine per missing allowance and will be required to ‘make good’ the 
damage. If the required allowances are of a future vintage and therefore still 
available to purchase, they will surrender these. If no appropriate vintage 
allowances exist (e.g. for the zero groundwater lag zone), they would surrender 
the next vintage. This penalty will probably need to be altered through time to 
ensure that it continues to be a deterrent against failing to cover nutrient loss. 
Figure 5: Example of the possible timing of activities in the nutrient trading 
system 
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calculation of nutrient loss. Then either: 
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Individuals can trade allowances at any time. These trades can occur for 
any quantity and any vintages of allowances and the price is negotiated between 
the two parties. Once the trade has been finalised, both parties need to inform the 
registry to get the participants’ allowance holdings altered. No pre-approval of 
trades is required.   
11 There may be reasons for limiting who can hold allowances and how 
much any one entity can hold. For example, ownership of nutrient loss allowances 
could be restricted to individuals who own land in the catchment and therefore 
will actually be able to use the allowances. This would prevent outsiders from 
speculating on the market and potentially driving up the price and/or locking up 
the allowances so that they are not available for use. Other restrictions could be 
put in place to prevent monopolistic behaviour. Any restrictions should be 
strongly justified as they add complexity and reduce flexibility. 
Our legal advice suggests that this simple form of trading can, in theory, 
be developed and operated within the context of the Resource Management Act 
(RMA) in its current form. This approach would involve a regime requiring 
regional consents (administered by EBOP under its Proposed Regional Water and 
Land Plan) for a range of activities that have the potential for nutrient leaching. 
The key element of the regime would be conditions on resource consents 
requiring specified numbers of nutrient allowances to be held and surrendered 
annually according to a process specified in the system rules. It is, however, 
important to note that the introduction and implementation of a nutrient trading 
programme is novel and to date legally untested. 
7  Changing the system through time 
A nutrient trading system that is designed for current conditions and 
with existing information will quickly become outdated as new information 
becomes available and social and political priorities change. In addition, this is an 
innovative policy instrument and unanticipated issues are likely to arise. To avoid 
a lengthy and potentially politically divisive process every time the system is 
altered, a clear adaptive management process should be put in place prior to the 
system’s introduction. First of all it is important to consider how to decide upon a 
specific change, then the process for implementing the change needs to be 
outlined. Two key features of the system are likely to require updating in the 
future are trading caps for each vintage and the model that is used to monitor 
nutrient loss.  
12 7.1  Deciding on a change 
The group who determines how and when changes in the system occur 
may face intense lobbying and pressure as various groups try to manipulate the 
system to their advantage. Thus we propose a two-tiered system: an advisory 
group and a smaller decision-making group. Firstly, a fairly large advisory group 
representing a range of perspectives considers the proposals for changes to the 
system, and then makes recommendations (which may not be unanimous). This 
group needs to be well supported by a strong research programme and technical 
advice. As it does not have decision-making power, this advisory group is more 
likely to make constructive decisions and achieve consensus when working 
through complex decisions. The group would present its recommendations, 
including any conflicting opinions, to a second smaller decision-making group. 
The smaller group is charged with making the final decisions about changes in the 
system. This group should use majority voting and be required to justify its 
decisions publicly.  
Both of these groups should have a set of clear guiding principles. The 
groups should have open and generous discussion and base decisions on the 
strongest possible science (while not letting uncertainty paralyse the system). 
Futhermore, they should encourage innovation and avoid benefits to special 
interests. They should also aim to protect property rights and the system as a 
whole. 
Once the smaller group decides a change, the initial system design 
needs to be modified to incorporate this change. Below, we discuss two of the 
most likely and disruptive changes to the nutrient trading system and how the 
process to implement them could be defined in advance. 
7.2  Changing trading caps  
A clear set of rules specifying how the nutrient trading cap is reduced 
should be outlined prior to the start of the system. These rules should specify how 
many years in advance the change is to be announced, and who will pay for the 
allowance reductions. This cost sharing should be based on the same principles as 
reducing nutrient loss when initially allocating allowances. For example, if 
13 allowance holders fund 30% of the initial reduction in allocated allowances, they 
should also fund 30% of any future changes in the cap. Similarly, if the trading 
cap were increased, allowance holders would receive 30% of the newly created 
allowances. 
Fixing these cost sharing rules in advance ensures that future decisions 
are only about the appropriate levels of the caps and not about who is paying for 
them. This should focus discussion on the optimal social decision rather than 
being biased by special interests. 
7.3  Changing the nutrient loss model 
When changes are made to the model, landowners should not have to 
enter the market to purchase extra allowances in order to continue in their current 
land use and activities. Regulation should not impose retrospective penalties (or 
rewards) on specific properties. We propose that landowners’ allocation of 
allowances are adjusted to account for the increase or decrease in allowances now 
needed to cover their nutrient loss. This involves giving allowances to or taking 
allowances from landowners to ensure that they are no better or worse off.  If the 
new model alters the aggregate level of nutrient loss, the adjustments to allowance 
levels to restore the environmental goal should use the same mechanism to 
address changes in the trading caps as outlined earlier.  
We hope that this prototype provides a good basis for assessing the 
feasibility and desirability of a nutrient trading system. We acknowledge that 
greater detail will be required to create a complete and functioning system. If a 
decision is made to explore this option further, this prototype provides useful 
guidance on areas that need more analysis and thought.   
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